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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the Albanian constitutional and legal framework on 
referenda, in general, focusing special attention to the abrogative referenda of a law or 
part thereof. Given the absence of any concrete case of an abrogative referenda held 
in Albania, which does not creates very much room for discussion in that regard, the 
paper, through a comparative approach on the referenda culture in other european 
states, aims at offering to the reader a more complete view on the mechanisms and 
guarantees enjoyed by voters and the effective way of their use, in order to give life to 
the direct democracy, but without replacing the representative one. In addition, part of 
the analyses will be the powers of the Constitutional Court for the ex ante constitutional 
review of the issue subject to a referendum, the review of constitutionality of the 
referndum and of its results. In this context, the paper will focus on the constitutional 
case-law as a tool for increasing the referenda culture and shaping the constitional 
order, as well as a source of standards and values. Another objective of the paper is 
to open a discussion on the need for the reception of referenda-related standards 
elaborated in those European countries, where the culture of helding a referenda and 
the case-law on the regard is enriched and may serve as a qualitative basis for further 
reference. 
Keywords: democracy; referendum; abrogative; judicial review; case-law 
Introduction: General reflections on the culture of referendum in Albania 
The fundamental law of the Republic of Albania, i.e. its Constitution stipulates that 
Albania is a parliamentary republic, where the sovregnity belong to the people, 
who exercise it through their representatives or directly.1 This dictum means that 
the prevailing form of democracy is the representative one, while the direct form is 
applied, through ad hoc popular initiave, i.e. as many times as 50 thousand citizens, 
who enjoy the right to vote, request the abrogation of a law, or when they request the 
President of the Republic to hold a referendum about issues of special importance.2 
1 See articles 1/1 and 2, point 2 and 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania
2 See article 150/1 of the Constitution
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The referendum in a representative democracy matters, as it a constitutional 
remedy associated with the notion of popular sovereignty, which is exercised either 
by its representatives or directly by the people. The principle of the exercise of 
sovereignty by the people means a democratic concept according to the criteria of 
a representative democracy, which also contains elements that enable the direct 
exercise of constitutional democracy. The instruments of direct democracy are not a 
competitive power to representative bodies, but represents instruments that allow 
the elimination of the lack of action by their members, or the balancing thereof. Those 
do not enable law-making, which is charged exclusively to the legislators. In this way, 
the referendum is presented as a tool for integration and promotion of the legislative 
process in parliament, in those cases where the principle of matching between the 
parliamentary majority will with that of the majority of people in a specific case, can 
not be applied. Therefore, the referendum is a tool that enables the transmission of 
voter opinion toward political bodies.3 
The first popular initiative for holding an abrogative referendum dates back in 2003 
when 53 000 voters required the abrogation of articles 4 and 6 of the law no.8889, 
dated 25.04.2002, “On some some additions and amendments to the law no.7703, 
dated 11.05.1993, “On Social Insurance in the Republic of Albania””4, while the second 
initiative dates in 2013, when, over 50 000 voters asked for the abrogation of articles 
22, paragraph 3 article 49 of law no.10463, dated 22.09.2011 “On the integrated 
waste management”5. Unfortunately, none of the popular initiatives took place, as in 
the first case, the Constitutional Court declared the question subject to the abrogative 
referendum as not in compliance with the Constitution, while, in the second case, 
even though the Constitutional Court pave the way toward holding an abrogative 
referendum, the new government that came into power after the 2013 parliamentary 
3 See decisions no.31, dated 19.11.2003 and no.8, dated 08.03.2013 of the Constitutional Court of Albania.
4 Inter alia, articles 4 and 6 of the law of 2002 has increased the age for old-age pension for men from 60 to 65 years and for 
women from 55 to 60, therefore amending article 31 of the law of 1993, which provided for the terms of the pension benefit, as 
well as article 34 of the same law, which defines the conditions of partial retirement pension. 
5 Article 22, paragraph 3 "Integrated network of waste treatment plants," provides that: "The Council of Ministers prohibits or 
restricts the import of waste destined for incineration, when classified as a recovery operation and is estimated that: a) such an 
action is necessary to protect the network of waste treatment plants, b) allow imports of such treatment or disposal of waste 
land in ways that do not comply with the integrated waste management relevant plans." Article 49 "Import of non-hazardous 
waste" which states that: "1. In the Republic of Albania shall be imported only non-hazardous waste and inert waste, other than 
those specified in paragraph 3 of Article 48 of this Law. 2. Importing waste according to item 1 of this law is possible only with 
the authorization of the Council of Ministers. 3. The application for import authorization shall be submitted to the ministry. 4. 
Authorization to import non-hazardous waste shall be issued only in full compliance with the law and other applicable acts. 5. 
Council of Ministers, when considering the application for the import of non-hazardous waste, shall take into account the reasons 
for the importation of these residues. The applicant authorization to import non-hazardous waste must prove that they are using 
all waste by type and code, as required. 6. The authorization for the import of non-hazardous waste is valid for a period up to 
one year and is subject to the general conditions set forth in regulations adopted pursuant to this law, as well as to any specific 
requirement relating to the case. 7. In authorizing the importation of waste are defined: a) the type of waste for which import 
issued b) standards relating to packaging and labeling of waste associated with documents during their transport c) requirements 
for monitoring and reporting the movements of waste. 8. Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Minister approves the list 
of waste allowed to be imported and regulations to implement this section. "
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elections, listed the contested law on waste management among the “to be abolished 
laws”. 
As stated above, since the approval of the Albanian Constitution in 1998, through 
a mixed procedure, i.e. approval by the Assembly and through a popular vote, no 
other referendum has been held. The Albanian reality has been largely characterised 
by voters’ apathy in taking popular initiatives, which has impacted negatively in 
establishing and promoting a referendum culture. The last year developments 
brought little improvement, due to the increasing of people awareness on their right 
to participate in decision-making process, in order to have their voice heard in policy-
drafting and important issues approval. Direct democracy can help to re-engage voters 
with politics and democracy, and in this context, the very first signs of increase of 
Albanian voters’ awareness on negative effects of apathy and disenchantment with 
traditional forms of democracy, shows that there is a light at the end of the long tunnel 
toward the consolidated democracy. 
General referendums, are optional in nature, since the assement of the need for 
holding (or not) a referendum depends not only in formal requirements as the 
collection of a large number of signatures (generally over 50 000), but also in sharing 
of a common interest on the issue subject to the referendum. Still, despite these 
potential obstacles, holding of a referendum in a representative democracy is a must; 
therefore, the stakeholders shall take the necessary measures to contribute to the 
increase of the referendum culture in Albania.
Albanian constitutional and legal framework on referendum 
The Constitution of Albania provides for types of referenda and the respective 
subjects entitled with this right. Constitutional referendum, aims at approving by 
a popular vote the constitutional amendaments, upon the request of one fifth of 
deputies; general referendum, upon the popular initiative, either for the abrogation 
of a law or for an issue of special importance, or upon the initiative of the Assembly 
(Parliament), when required by one fifth of deputies or the Council of Ministers to 
put an issue or a draft law of a special importance to a popular vote; local referendum 
on local government issues, upon the request of 10 percent of registered voters of 
the commune or municipality. In addition to these provisions, the constitutional and 
legal framework provides for bans in holding a referendum which are related either 
the nature of the question/issue or to the time to conduct a referendum.6 On the 
other hand, principles and modalities for holding the referendum and its validity are 
prescribed by law, namely “Electoral Code”. The set of rules on referendums conduct 
dates back in 2003, when it was first provided by the Electoral Code, which has been 
subject to several amendments in the framework of a continous and contentious 
6 See Part XI and XVII of the Constitution, articles 150-152 and 177
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electoral reforms, nevertheless, provisions on referendum has been always excluded 
from being part of this process.7 
The Electoral Code specifies the conditions and criterias related to holding a referendum, 
listing as such: first, the request to begin the procedures for the abrogation of a law 
or a part thereof shall be presented by a group of not less than 12 initiators, who shall 
be voters registered in the National Register of Voters; second, it shall be submitted to 
the Central Election Commission (CEC); third, the request for the abrogation of a law 
or a part of it is acceptable when the remaining part of the law is self-sufficient; fourth, 
it shall contain two mandatory elements: a) the title, number and date of approval of 
law that is required to be abrogated, and if required to be repealed only a part of the 
law, its relevant provisions; b) the reasons why the law or specific provisions to be 
abrogated.8 
The same provision provides further that the request to begin procedures for the 
referendum on a matter of special importance should clearly outline the issue raised, 
its importance and position of the initiators in connection with the issue. The question 
should be formulated clearly, fully and unequivocally and in a way that voters be able 
to answer “YES” or “NO”9. Prima facie, by comparing the legal formulation of points 
4 and 5 it is not clear if the requirement “that the request be formulated clearly, fully 
and unequivocally” shall be considered as a “fifth criteria” to be applied for all types of 
referendums’ request. Therefore, in the light of the above findings there is a need for 
the harmonisation of the terminology, therefore of the content of the Electoral Code 
provisions.
The process is a complex one, as it incorporates not only the initiators’ role, but also 
that of the CEC, which in this procedural phase, shall be admitted that it is a formal one, 
meaning that it is limited in the assessment of the completion of formal requirements10. 
The CEC verifies the signatures and accuracy of the voter’s identification documents, 
in accordance with the regulations issued by it and decides to accept or reject the 
request within 90 days from the date of its submission, grounding its decision on the 
7 Law no.10019, dated 29.12.2008 “The Electoral Code of the rRepublic of Albania”, as amended does not contain at all provisions 
on referedum, but only a transitory provision, article 185 stating that: "… provisions for referendums (Part IX of law no.9087/2003) 
and any part of its related provisions shall remain in force until the adoption of the new law on general and local referendums. 
The administration of the referendum process and the disclosure of their outcome shall be made  in accordance with this Code".
8 See article 126, points 3, 4 of 2003 EC
9 Article 126, point 5 of 2003 EC 
10 Article 127 provides that “Within 20 days from the submission of the request for a general referendum, the CEC provides the 
initiator group, against payment, with forms for the collection of signatures of 50 thousand voters registered in the National 
Register of Voters at the time of application submission. At the top of the form shall be placed the title of the law, or the 
provisions required to be repealed or the issue that shall be put to the referenda vote. Signatures in support of the request for a 
general referendum shall be deposited to the CEC in the period from January 1st to November 30th of each year”. 
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regularity of the submitted documentation.11 The above legal provisions provide for a 
procedure which has largely been defined as the legitimating stage12. The CEC is the 
body required by the law to verify the regularity of requests for general referendum, 
while it has the duty to convey these applications to the President of the Republic and 
to the Constitutional Court, except for the cases expressly provided for in Article 119 
of the Electoral Code.13 CEC also informs the Assembly Speaker and the Prime Minister 
received requests.
In fact, the Constitution does not mention the CEC in none of the articles regulating the 
referendum, while referring to the constitutional case-law, there is a lack of consistency 
regarding the subject legitimated as “the applicant”. In 2003 the Constitutional Court 
legitimated 53 000 voters without interpreting the grounds for their legitimation, 
while in 2013 case, the CEC was legitimated based on the following arguments: “The 
CEC is legitimated ratione materiae, as it represents the entity which is recognized 
by the Electoral Code the competence for putting into motion of an ex ante review of 
the constitutionality of the request for a general abrogative referendum. In addition, 
the applicant claims are prima facie the competence of the Constitutional Court, as 
they are included in the constitutional articles no.131/ ë and 152/1, stipulating that 
the Constitutional Court decides on the “constitutionality of referendums” and “ex 
ante review of the constitutionality of issues put to referendum”. In terms of ratione 
temporis legitimation, the request is filed within the period prescribed by the Electoral 
Code.”14 
In the light of the constitutional interpretation of subjects’ legitimation, as well as 
considering the case circumstances, in my opinion the correct argumentation would 
be that of 2013 decison. The initiators’ group is an entity mentioned only by the law 
(Electoral Code) and does not represent any particular association or group, but simply 
a group of individuals sharing the same interest in holding an abrogative referendum, 
entitled with the right to vote (either active or passive). Even though such a process 
11 The decision shall be notified immediately to the initiators. In the case of a rejecting decision the CEC should clearly determine 
the causes of rejection. Within 5 days of notification of the decision, the initiators may declare to the CEC its readiness to correct 
irregularities. In this case, the CEC shall set a deadline up to 30 days for the resubmittion of the request. The CEC shall decide 
within 10 days whether to accept the request and shall notify immediately the initiators.
12 See “Commentario ala Constituzione Italiana”, 2006, pg.1476
13 Article 119 “Restrictions on the exercise of the right for a referendum” “1.No general or constitutional referendum can be held 
on the date of election of Assembly or of the local government organs. 2. A constitutional referendum or a general one shall not 
be held during the period of six months before the end of the mandate of the Assembly until three months after the first meeting 
of the new Assembly. 3. A local referendum shall not be held during the period of three months before the expiry of the mandate 
of the local government organ up to three months after the first meeting of the local councils. 4. When early elections to the 
Assembly are announced, the procedure for holding a referendum is suspended until after the expiration of three months from 
the first meeting of the new Assembly. 5. When the local government unit announced early elections, procedures for holding a 
local referendum on the unit is suspended until after the expiration of three months from the beginning of the mandate of the 
local government body. 6. In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 152 of the Constitution, the request for the referendum, 
which have not passed through all the procedures of this chapter, by March 15 of each year, regardless of when made, shall be 
postponed until next year.
14 See judgment no.8, dated 08.03.2013 of the Constitutional Court of Albania (www.gjk.gov.al) 
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would not exist if the group of initiator would not submit such a request to the CEC, 
considering the nature of the process, CEC has been instituionalised as the organ, 
which, after the formal examination of the request for a referendum, comes up to the 
consclusion that the request meets all requirements and decides, in accordance with 
Articles 128 and 129 of the Electoral Code. This competence of the CEC is in function 
of its legitimation for initiating the constitutional process of ex ante verification of the 
constitutionality of the request for referendum.
Considering the “age” the legal provisions regulating the conduct of a referendum, 
it is normal to put into question their compliance with the current social, economic, 
political reality, public awareness on the importance of the right to vote, the debate 
on the referenda culture, etc. Although the above set of legal rules and procedures 
has been in the focus of the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission expertise15, which 
has found not only inconsistent provisions16, but also lack of compliance with the 
Constitutions in terms of procedures17 and powers granted to the constitutional 
organs18, no legislative initiative has been undertaken so far in order to bring the 
legal framework in line with constitutional and international standards on referenda. 
Currently, upon the initiative of the political parties, the electoral legal framework is 
undergoing another reform; let’s hope the above concerns will be properly addressed. 
European heritage on referendum
The nature of the referendum varies depending on whether it is mandatory or 
optional, as well as on the body who is granted the right to call a referendum. In this 
regard, shall be distinguished three types of referendums: (a) mandatory; (b) at the 
request of an authority; and (c) at the request of a part of the electorate. The last 
15 http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-EL%282004%29002rev-e.aspx, see “Joint Reccomendations on the 
Electoral Law and the Electoral Adminstration in Albania” of the Europan Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission, CoE) and teh Office for Democratic Instituions aand Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE on the basis of comments 
by Mr Jessie Pilgrim (OSCE/ODIHR, expert, USA) Mr Adriaan Stoop (OSCE/ODIHR, expert, the Netherlands) 
16 It is recommended that the relevant deadlines and inconsistent references related to referenda elections be corrected as 
Article 119, clause (6) sets 15 March of each year as the deadline for the completion of all legal procedures for a request for 
a referendum election. However, Article 127, clause (2) establishes the period between 1 January and 30 November as the 
time period for submitting the 50,000 supporting signatures required for a referendum election. Articles 128 and 129 provide 
for procedures related to the request which might require up to 195 days, thereby greatly exceeding the 15 March deadline 
established in Article 119, clause (6). 
17 Article 126 (3) of the Electoral Code recognizes the right to abrogate parts of a law through a general referendum. This appears 
to conflict with Article 150 of the Constitution as the latter grants the right to abrogate a law- not the right to rewrite portions 
through selective referendum abrogation. Also it is recommended that Article 126 be amended in order to comply with Article 
150, clause (1) of the Constitution
18 Clause (3) of Article 129 grants the President of Albania the power to decide that a referendum requested should not be held 
and, after making such a decision, advises the CEC in writing of his reasons, which the CEC transmits to the initiators. This is 
tantamount to granting the President power to overrule the Constitutional Court’s decision under clause (2) The EC empowers 
the President to quash the constitutional rights of the 50,000 citizens who initiated the referendum. It is recommended that 
Article 129 be amended in order to comply with Articles 150 and 152 of the Constitution. It should also be noted that clause (2) 
of Article 129 stipulates that the Constitutional Court decides whether a request for a referendum is formulated in accordance 
with clauses (3) and (5) of Article 126. However, it appears that the Constitutional Court should also decide whether a request 
for a referendum contains the data specified in clause (4) of Article 126, therefore it is reccomended that this be clarified too.
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one is divided into two subcategories: (c/1) ordinary optional referendum, generally 
focused on a text adopted by a state body; and (c/2) popular initiative, in the strict 
sense, which allows a part of the electorate to propose a text not approved yet by any 
authority. In the case of popular initiative the role of the authorities, in particular, of 
the Parliament, is limited.19 
The text submitted to referendum vote may appear in different forms: (i) drafted 
in concrete terms (a specifically-worded draft) of a constitutional amendament, a 
legislative acts, including the repeal of an existing norm; (ii) question in principle (e.g. 
“Are you in favor of changing the constitution to forecast a presidential system of 
government?”); or,(iii) a concrete proposal, not in the form of a concrete norm, but as 
a “proposal drafted in general terms (generally-worded proposal)” (for example: “Are 
you in favor of changing the constitution in order to reduce the number of seats in 
Parliament by 300 to 200?”.20
Venice Commission expertise states that: 
“Regardless of the form in which the request for a referendum is presented, in 
terms of formal validity it shall meet the following principles: (i) Unity of form: 
the application can not be formulated as a combination of two different forms 
(e.gg formulation in concrete terms, formulation in general terms, or a proposal 
in principle). (ii) Unity of content: except where the request relates to the review of 
the entire law, in all other cases there should be a common link between different 
parts of the request/question put on vote, in order to garantiing the right to vote 
(there should be no expectation that voters accept or reject, in whole, provisions 
having no relation among them). This principle is an expression of the freedom of 
vote. (iii) Unity of hierarchical level: laws of different hierarchical levels shall not 
be put in referenda vote simultaneously (e.g. the Constituion and other legislation 
approved on the bases and for the implementation of the Constitution). (iv) Clear 
questions and no guidelines: freedom to vote means that “the question presented 
to the electorate must be clear (not unknown, nor with several meanings), it should 
not lead to misunderstandings, nor to suggest a different answer: voters should 
be informed of the consequences of the referendum, should answer “yes” or “no”, 
or even a blank vote. These principles, which are expressly sanctioned by some 
national legislation, must be considered universal”.21 
19 See for more Pierre Garrone, Venice Commission (Council of Europe), Referenda in Europe, pgs.4-5, where the author brings 
as examples of countries where mechanisms of ordinary optional referendum and popular initiative are developed significantly 
Switzerland, Italy, Malta, Denmark, Russia, Albania, Poland, Portugal, Hungary, Macedonia, etc. For example, in Switzerland, 
"referendum" against laws relevant to international agreements and federal orders can be requested by 50,000 citizens, while 
"popular initiative" requires for 100,000 citizens who may request the revision the Constitution, while the "general popular 
initiative" could lead to a change of law. In Lithuania, the demand for ordinary optional referendum or popular initiative must 
be submitted by 500,000 signatories, while in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by 150,000 signatories, or in Lithuania by 
one tenth of the electorate. 
20 Ibid, pg.6
21 Ibid, pg 7
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Rearding the material validity of the text put in referenda vote shall be in compliance 
with the highest law (the principle of norms hierarchy) and not contrary to the 
international law or statutory principle of the Council of Europe, namely democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law22.
Constitutional review of a request for an abrogative referendum: Comparative approach
The constitutionality review procedure, which is defined as the admissibility stage, has 
been debatable both from the doctrinal view and the case-law regarding the nature of 
review exercised, i.e. if it shall be of administrative or jurisdictional nature. However, 
taking into account the organ charged with this competence, i.e. Constitutional Court, 
the content of this function makes the juridisctional element prevail. If considering 
the procedural element, the competence given to the Constitutional Court, belongs 
to the phase of review as a prerequisite for the validity of the proceedings. However, 
it is clear that the contribution of constitutional case-law in this regard, can not be 
evaluated strictly in procedural terms. Moreover, the case-law shall be credited for the 
visible and significant identification of the abrogative referendum institutional profile 
and its position among the sources of law.23
The importance of judicial review of the referendum in some countries reflects the 
general situation of this type of control. Thus, countries that have little or no judicial 
control as Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, Sweden, Finland, Greece 
or Luxembourg (as countries frequenting less the referendum) limit this type of formal 
control only on regularity of the process and the form of application. Since 1999, 
Switzerland has foreseen a material limitation of the constitutional popular initiative, 
since under Article 139 (2) of the Federal Constitution the popular initiative may be 
declared invalid by the Federal Assembly (political body), through a priori control, if 
the matter does not respect requirements of uniformity of shape and subject/issue, 
but even in the case when it violates binding norms of international law.
Judicial review of the referendum request traditionally has been related to the process 
conducted for holding a referendum, i.e. compliance with rules relating to the start of 
the referendum campaign, voting, etc and less on the formal and material aspect of 
the issue. Formal validity of the issue put in referendum vote shall be assessed in the 
light of clarity and uniformity of the question/issue (e.g. USA, Switzerland or Italy), 
which is considered as the minimum requirement of referenda. The material validity 
of the issue is, first of all, related to the assessment of areas which are subject to 
referendum. Application of one form of assessment or of other depends on the nature 
of the referendum (either legislative or constitutional), but also by the hierarchical 
ranking of the legislation on referendum24. 
22 Venice Commssion, Code of Good Practices in Referendums, CDL-AD(2007)008rev, 21 Janary 2009
23 See “Commentario ala Constituzione Italiana”, 2006, pg.1476 
24 Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo, The Oxford Book of Comparative Constitutional Law, 2012, pgs.522-523
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Regarding the authorities entitled with the exercise of judicial control, sometimes, they 
are political bodies, e.g. the Federal Assembly in Switzerland, administrative courts 
controlling the regularity of the process, or the courts, generally, constitutional courts 
charged with reviewing the issue (e.g. Italy). This kind of control can be automatic or 
mandatory (e.g. in France after 2008 reform25). With regard to the moment of control 
(before or after), a priori control is deemed reasonable and is, currently, the rule to 
control the regularity of referendums (U.S. or Italy), in terms of material control on 
the issue (especially, compliance with the legislation of a higher hierarchy) the rules 
are not very clear as this type of control exercised a posteriori goes contrary to the 
principle of popular sovereignty.26
Especially, the Italian doctrinal elaboration of the referendums’ institute, its legal 
and constitutional framework and, in particular, the Constitutional Court case-law is 
one of the best practices and a valuable reference point on that regard. The Italian 
Constitution, in article 75, provides that: “General referendum may be held to repeal, 
in whole or in part, a law or a measure having the force of law, when so requested 
by five hundred thousand voters or five Regional Councils. No referendum may be 
held on a law regulating taxes, the budget, amnesty or pardon, or a law ratifying 
an international treaty. Any citizen entitled to vote for the Chamber of deputies has 
the right to vote in a referendum. The referendum shall be considered to have been 
carried if the majority of those eligible has voted and a majority of valid votes has 
been achieved. The law defines the approach of the referendum.” In addition to the 
constitutional framework, the constitutional law no.1/1953 (article 2) determined 
the Constitutional Court as the body charged with the competence to examine the 
admissibility of a request for a referendum, while law no.352/1970 has defined the 
procedures for holding a referendum. 
In the light of the Italian Constitutional Court, the jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility 
of a request for abrogative referendum has specific and autonomous features 
compared to other powers reserved to it (see decisions nr.251/1975; nr.16/1978). The 
constitutionality of the law subject to the referendum is not subject to constitutional 
25 France is the example of those countries, that although having a few past traditions in holding referenda, nowdays are moving 
towards a consolidated judicial review in this area. After the constitutional reform of 2008, the Constitution, in article 61 provides 
that "institutional acts before their promulgation, Private Bills, according to Article 11, before put in referendum, regulations 
of both Houses of Parliament and acts of Parliament shall, before entry into force, referred to the Constitutional Council, which 
decides on their compliance with the Constitution."Article 11 and Institutional Act recognize the President’s authority, that 
upon the recommendation by the Government or the joint motion of two Parliament’s Houses, published in Official Journal, 
to put to a referendum any government bill concerning the organization of public authorities or economic reforms, or social 
or environmental policies of the country, or public services, or providing authorization for the ratification of a treaty, which 
although in accordance with Constitution, may affect the functioning of institutions. If the referendum is held at the request 
of the Government, the later must submit a statement before each Chamber that is followed by a debate. The referendum on 
specific issues referred expressly by the norm may be required by one fifth of the deputies supported by one tenth of the voters. 
This initiative should take the form of a bill (private) and shall not be applied for abrogation of a rule that it has entered into force 
a year ago. Terms of submission and those under which the Constitutional Council asses the respect of the above provisions are 
provided by the Institutional Act
26 Supra note, at 25, pgs.522-523
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review. In addition, neither laws relating to taxes, budget, amnesty or pardon nor laws 
on ratification of the international treaty can be subject to referendum. The right to 
vote in a referendum belongs to every citizen with the right to vote for Houses of 
deputies. The referendum shall be deemed completed upon voted by a majority of 
voters and a majority vote is achieved (see decisions nr.15/2008; nos.45-48/ 2005; 
nr.13/2012). In the constitutional order does exist such values, which should be 
protected by excluding them as being subject to the referendum, values which are 
beyond the cases envisaged by the Constitution. In this context: First, are unacceptable 
those requests formulated in such a way that every question will be presented to 
voters (electoral body) contains a heterogeneous set of questions that lack common 
denominator of rational connection, to that extend that those does not follow the 
logic of Article 75 of the Constitution.This rule applies also for those requests, which 
are clearly and arbitrarily separated by the constitutional goals of the referendum, 
as a tool for genuine expression of popular sovereignty. Secondly, are unacceptable 
those requests which are not related to the state legislative acts having the force 
of ordinary law, but tending to nullify - fully or partially - the Constitution, the laws 
of constitutional revision, “other constitutional laws” and acts other with “passive 
special power” that can not be repealed by ordinary legislation. These laws can not 
be repealed neither by ordinary legislative acts due to their “constitutional cover”, 
nor though a referendum.27 Third, are unacceptable those referendums requests 
having as a subject norms belonging to ordinary legislation, but having constitutional 
importance, which content can not be changed or become ineffective, without causing 
conflict with the respective constitutional norms (or other constitutional laws) (see 
decision nr. 35/1997).28 Following this precedent, the electoral laws are considered as 
“necessary constitutional laws”, therefore, requests for the complete abrogation of 
electoral laws contravenes the principle of constant activity of constitutional bodies, 
therefore is unacceptable. Still, the electoral laws may be subject to an abrogative 
referendum only for a few provisions (partial deletion), upon the condition that after 
the abrogation, these constitutional bodies can function (see decisions no.13/1999 
and no.33/2000)29. Fourth, besides the inadmissibility grounds expressively described 
by the Constitution (article 75), implied criteria are also applicable. Therefore, are 
excluded from referendum those norms which effects are closely related to the 
scope of the laws stipulated in Article 75, and in this context, their exclusion should 
27 In this category are included also Patti Lateranensi provided in Article 7 of the Constitution which are agreements between the 
Italian state with Vatican.
28 This principle was elaborated during the examination of a request for holding a referendum for the abrogation entirely of 
the abortion law, which in the assessment of the Italian CC "would nullify the minimum necessary protection of inviolable 
constitutional rights such as right to life, right to health, etc. This case was considered by the doctrine as the precedent, according 
to which the constitutionality of the Act is inadmissibility in terms of constitutional considerations.
29 Upon these considerations, the Italian CC has considered unacceptable several requests for a referendum, aiming at aborogation 
of the entire law. Similar positions has been held regarding requests for holding electoral referendums in 1999 and in 2000.
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be considered as implied.30 In line with these principles, a referendum on abolishing 
the mandatory laws of the European Community can not be held. Reference is made 
to those normative acts for which the national legislator discretion is mandatory 
by EU law (see decision nr.31/2000). Fifth, In 2005 the Constitutional Court further 
elaborated the inadmissibility criteria in cases of a request for the entire abolition 
of the ordinary laws, which are constitutionally necessary, by preventing holding 
of a referendum for abrogation of those laws that provide for a range of interests 
protected by the Constitution and, as such, in any case require a legislative framework 
(e.g. law on artificial fertilization). Reasons for this additional exclusion include the 
need for their necessary existence in the legal order either because they are essential 
to the functioning of constitutional bodies, or because they are provided directly by 
the specific provisions of the Constitution. The absence of these laws would make 
the constitutional ruling, impossible (e.g. law on the functioning of the High Council 
of Justice, etc.) (see decisions no.29/1987, no.47/199; no.45/2005). Sixth, in order to 
guarantee the freedom of vote, the Court has emphasized that such requests, in order 
to be eligible, shall be complete, clear and univocal. The completeness of the request 
is a prerequisite for the referendum to be clear, meaning that that the voter should be 
able to understand the scope of abrogating, as well as its consequences and what is 
the purpose that the promoters of the referendum seek to achieve. An essential tool 
of direct democracy, such as abrogative referendum can not be transformed - without 
doubt - in a distorted instrument of representative democracy, through which, in 
essence, are proposed plebiscites or popular confidence motion against the general 
elections inseparable from political parties or organized groups that have supported 
referendum initiatives (see decisions no.16/1978, nos.24, 25, 26, 28, 31/1981, 
no.27/1982, no.28/1987, no.32/1993).
The constitutional judgment on the admissibility of the referendum aims to provide: 
a) the lack of prohibitions/bans (stipulated or implied the Constitution), in conjunction 
with provisions protected by the referendum question (laws authorizing the 
ratification of international treaties, tax laws, budgetary laws, amnesty and pardon 
laws, constitutional laws, laws having a constituional content, or or constitutionally 
necessary); and b) the presence of the referendum question formulation criteria, 
i.e consistency, clarity and simplicity, unique character, completeness, consistency, 
adaptability to the purpose, respecting the essentially ablative nature of the 
referendum. The assessment of suitability, adequacy and clarity of the question subject 
to an abrogative referendum is necessary to: a) individualize the goal to be achieved, 
b) adjusting the outcome of the referendum; c) to compare the results deriving from 
the first two points (see decision no.26/1981, no.45/2005; no.16/2008). 
30 For example, are excludes by being subject to a referendum laws authorizing the ratification of international treaties, what shall 
be interpreted that are, also, excluded laws that provide for the execution of these treaties. Another example of exclusion from 
being subject to an abrogative referendum the issue on immigration of extracommunity citizens, considering this an obligation 
deriving from the Community law, in particular the Convention and the Schengen agreement, i.e. the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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The request for a referendum is an act devoid of motives, since the objective of 
signatories does not derives from declaring their purpose, but only from the purpose 
included in the question of the referendum, i.e. the goal objectively attainable resulting 
from the relationship between the norms subject to abrogative referendum and those 
that will result after abrogation. In other words, the question is interpreted exclusively 
on the basis of its formulation and considering the impact of the referendum on the 
normative framework (sees decision no.25/2011). 31
The dilemma of the reception by Albanian Constitutional case-law of referendum 
request admissibility criteria elaborated by other Constitutional Courts 
The comparative law has been largely used in the Albanian constitutional case-law 
in general. Considering the age of the Constitutional Court in Albania, established in 
1992, as well as the age of the Constitution, approved in 1998, it is understandable 
that the constitutional and legal vacuum needed models of reference in order to best 
shape the Albanian constitutional order, as well as to “furnish” it with best values and 
standards. 
The Albanian Constitutional Court, in assessing the limits of the constitutionality 
review of the request for an abrogative general referendum has been referred to the 
constitutional provisions. Article 152, paragraph 1 and 2 provides that the Constitutional 
Court is the body charged with the power to review, through a preliminary screening 
(ex ante), the constitutionality of the issues listed expressively in constitutional 
provisions.32 The framers of the Constitution has excluded two cathegory of issues 
that cannot be voted upon in a referendum, therefore, from being subject to the ex 
ante constitutional review: first, issues or draft-laws of special importance, but without 
mentioning the criteria to be met by an issue/draft-law in order to be classified as such; 
second, issues related to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Albania, limitations 
of fundamental human rights and freedoms, budget, taxes, financial obligations of 
the state, declaration and abrogation of the state of emergency, declaration of war 
and peace, as well as amnesty; third, the importance of special issues. In addition to 
the reqirements related to the nature of the issue, another restriction for holding a 
referendum is related to the time, i.e a referndum upon the same issue cannot be 
repeated before 3 years have passed since it was held.
In the light of the 2003 constitutional case-law on abrogative referendum, constitutional 
analyses have been largely based on the case-law of Italian Constitutional Court and 
that of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, as well as in their constitutional 
31 The request for the admissibility of the referendum for the abrogation of article 15 of law "The choice of the management 
and procurement procedures”, Legislative Decree of April 3, 2006, no.152 (Environmental Regulations), as amended by article 2, 
paragraph 13 of Legislative Decree January 16, 2008, no.4, amended by section 12 of the Decree of the President of the Republic 
September 7, 2010, Article 168. 
32 See articles 150, paragraphs 1 and 2, articles 151, paragraphs 2 and 3, and article 177, paragraphs 4 and 5.
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and legal requirements.While in 2013 decision the constitutional analyses were based 
only in assessing the existence of constitutional bans in direct reference to the Albanian 
Constitution; therefore, making no reference neither to further developments of the 
european case-law, nor to the legal requirements of self-sufficiency or clarity of the 
request.33 A justification for this could be the results of the constitutional review, i.e. 
in 2003 the request for holding a referendum was found contrary to the Constitution; 
therefore, more arguments were needed for its rejection, while in 2013, the CC 
assessed the request as being in compliance with the Constitution, by accepting the 
request and paving the way to holding an abrogative referendum. 
In the light of the above findings, reference to the doctrinal developments of other 
European countries as well as to the European constitutional case-law has served to 
solve difficult problems, to think more clearly, to revive the hidden potential energy, 
to enlarge perspectives, to enrich arguments, to pay attention to the specific issues 
that might, in other circumstances, would be ignored.34. In this context, there shall 
be no more dilemma on incorporating “others’ best standards” fearing that this could 
affect the context of constitutional decision making, due to the fact that comparative 
approach has always contributed to ensuring a common understanding of values and 
standards, as well as to the consolidation of Albanian constitutional case-law, without 
interfering with its own identity in the constitutional design. 
Conclusions
The analyses of the Albanian constitutional and legal framework on referenda, in 
general, and abrogative referenda of a law or part thereof, in particular shows that 
there is a need for further revision in order to ensure consistency in the constitutional 
order. The lack of the referendum culture in Albania is a determinative factor for 
increasing public awareness, but also a reason for adaption of the comparative 
approaches outcomes in order to ensure the mechanisms and guarantees necessary 
for an effective democracy, be it representative or a direct one. In this regard, the role 
of Constitutional Court and its case-law becomes of a crucial importance as a tool 
for increasing the referenda culture and shaping the constitutional order, as well as a 
33 In 2003 the CC interpreted the first criteria as a prerequisite for the acceptance of abrogative referendum request has been 
defined as a prohibition provided for in the Electoral Code which is in harmony with the constitutional principle of representative 
democracy. In this regard, if, after the abrogation of the law by referendum, the remaining part of the law would not be self-
sufficient, then there would be a legal vacuum, a situation that obliges the legislator, against his will, to fill this vacuum. This 
situation, if repeated often, would violate the fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy and the key principle of the 
rule of law, namely, the principle of legal certainty. While the criteria of "the question/issue formulated in a clear, complete and 
unequivocally manner and in a way that voters be able to answer "YES"or "NO", takes significant value not only as a main source 
for the orientation (right or wrong) of 50 thousand voters on referendum day, but, especially, to the result of the referendum 
if the intention of the initiators, the understanding of the issue/question and the outcome of the referendum goes in the same 
direction (see decision no. 31/2003). See for more the discenting opinion of judge V.Tusha in decision no.8/2013
34 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, 1956-2006 Ciunquant’anni di Corte Constituzionale, Corte in - politica, Vol. III, 2006, pgs.1790-1976 
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qualitative source of standards and values. Still, reference to the constitutional case-
law of other European countries is a must; therefore no dilemma or fear of loosing its 
own identity shall exist on that regard. 
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